



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

## RECENT CASES

---

**ADVERSE POSSESSION—PROPERTY SUBJECT TO PRESCRIPTION—PROPERTY DEDICATED TO PUBLIC USE.**—*TOWN OF ELDORADO v. RITCHIE GROCERY CO.*, 104 S. W. 549 (ARK.).—Where land donated to a town for street purposes on condition that it survey the same and lay out streets thereon, and keep them in good condition, was thereafter, on failure to perform such condition, conveyed to another, and for more than seven years held adversely to the town, and permanent and valuable improvements put thereon, title was in the occupant.

The rules laid down by the courts in this matter are exceedingly diverse and unsatisfactory. In *Sheen v. Stothart*, 29 La. Ann. 630, it was stated that after a dedication to public use, no silence or length of time or non-user can deprive a public corporation of its power, and until the time arrives when the land is actually needed for street purposes, no mere non-user will operate as an abandonment, *Reilly v. Racine*, 51 Wis. 526; so also in *Webb v. Demopolis*, 95 Ala. 116, the city holds in trust for its citizens and statute of limitations does not run against her; and public rights cannot be destroyed by long continued trespasses, *Kittaning v. Brown*, 41 Pa. St. 269, therefore, there is no loss of public right by non-user, *Hfd. v. N. Y. & N. E. R. R. Co.*, 59 Conn. 250. In *Rowan's Ex'rs. v. Town of Portland*, 47 Ky. 232, it was said that ground being dedicated to a town for public use, the right is not lost for want of use, while in *Williams v. First Presbyterian Society of Cincinnati*, 1 Ohio St. 478, the court held that the right of a county or town to property dedicated may be barred by statute of limitations.

**APPEAL—HARMLESS ERROR—ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE.**—*LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. ET AL., v. GOLLIHUR*, 82 N. E. 492 (IND.).—In an action for death in a railroad collision, caused by negligence of the train dispatcher, the admission of a letter from a railroad officer, which was pinned to the original dispatch, held, under the circumstances, not prejudicial to defendant.

**ATTORNEY AND CLIENT—AUTHORITY OF ATTORNEY—PRESUMPTION.**—*AARON v. U. S. ET AL.*, 155 Fed. 833.—*Held*, the entry of appearance for a defendant by an attorney is presumed to have been authorized, and, to relieve himself from the effect of such appearance, such defendant has the burden of proving to the satisfaction of the court that it was unauthorized.

**BURGLARY—NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF OFFENSE—BREAKING AND ENTERING—STATUTES.**—*ANDERSON v. STATE*, 104 S. W. 1096 (ARK.).—*Held*, that the prying off of a wooden shutter over a window of a store without opening or breaking the window, and the cutting of an inch square hole through the door of the store too far from the latch to permit the use of an instrument to unfasten the door, did not constitute a breaking or entering sufficient to sustain a charge of burglary under a statute which provided that burglary